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and an intellectual orphan to the behavioral revolution in historical
methodology.
ROBERT FAULKNER13

The next task for constitutional scholarship, it seems to me,
remains the grand old task kept alive by a few scholars: taking the
Constitution seriously. Preserving the general government in its
constitutional vigor and limits, and individual rights in their Constitutional extent, was long understood to be the constitutional duty of
officials. It should also be the lodestar of American students of law
and politics. So to speak in 1987, however, subjects one to bitter
attacks, not to mention ridicule. An orientation by the original
Constitution is repudiated in effect by a majority of the Supreme
Court-and openly by most judges and scholars. It has become a
party matter, and Attorney General Meese's exhortation to abide
by original intent has evoked a torrent of indignant repudiation.
Another sign: the Bicentennial seems unenthusiastically backed,
awkwardly excused, and just plain embarrassing to most judges and
legal scholars. It is something like the exhumation of a distinguished elder whom a zealous village establishment would like
thought dead of natural causes.
There continue to appear, of course, first-rate studies considering the prudent application of constitutional provisions. I think of
Robert Scigliano's examination of "The War Powers Resolution
and the War Powers" (in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order
(J. Bessette & J. Tulis ed. 1981)), Robert Steamer's assessment of
the Chief Justices (Chief Justice (1986), James W. Ceaser's Presidential Selection (1979), and James Q. Wilson's "Does the separation of powers still work?" (The Public Interest, Winter 1987). If
other scholars take such works as models, we should rejoice.
There are grave obstacles to such a happy future, however.
First and foremost is the dominant progressive scholarship of more
than a half-century, which has declared obsolete the old constitutionalism of limited government and equality of opportunity. It is
now joined to a bastard relative disillusioned with progress and yet
determined to progress beyond. Radical or rad-lib scholars are at
once politically complacent, since they are assured that history has
disposed of the merits of the old, and politically zealous or peculiarly principled, since they suppose that equal dignity and liberation are alone right and historically fitting. We face a scholarly mix
of historical assurance and moral zealotry that inclines to corrode
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all political authority, including constitutional institutions. Skeptical about governmental and economic hierarchies, permissive about
traditional morality, the mixture caters to the hollow idealist and
the crowd. It promotes an idealistic universalism that barely covers
a weak political nihilism ("peace," "respect for all lifestyles," "nonjudgmental"), and that encourages the perennial democratic aversions to authority, foresight, civic virtue, and self-restraint. Governing becomes harder and guilt-ridden; indulgence and vice, easier
and loud. Big subsidies, big deficits, a weakened presidency, bluff
and weakness abroad, the power of public opinion and the media,
democratization of elections and of the Congress, vulgar public
taste, the erosion of families and real community-follow or are
aided. This is the crisis of American constitutionalism.
Scholars can help by defense, by attack, and, in both, by wise
constitutional exposition. They can defend the old constitutionalism by accounts of particular institutions and of the general working of our constitutional republic. In such a spirit historical studies
are indispensable-for we need to recover what is disdained or forgotten. More obviously useful are applications of constitutional
principles to practical problems-such as the extent of Congress's
rightful controls over executive war making, or over legislative redistricting. Judges and lawyers do it every day; the problem is to
encourage them, as Walter Berns has done, to take seriously constitutionalism, rather than an ignoble and impolitic egalitarianism.
Last, but not least, one must reveal the foolishness of the enemy.
One must show the difference between preoccupation with the status of the so-called disadvantaged, and the real health of individual
rights, of equality of opportunity, of school, city, and church, of the
economy, and of, in general, a constitutional republic or democracy.
NORMAN ROSENBERQ14
When considering "What Next?" in constitutional history, a
1987 New Republic piece, decrying scholarship-overload and pro-

posing a partial moratorium on publication of "new" works, came
to mind. The journal's editors, foregoing Crit-bashing for a moment, singled out sociology as the most egregious example of hyperpublication, but many of us living in the aftermath of the Bicentennial may have briefly thought that constitutional history could provide an appropriate area in which to test the feasibility of a limited
Anti-Publication Control Treaty or ABCT. (The more descriptive
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